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[Separate No. 149] 



The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
By Frank Heywood Hodder, Ph. M. 

Professor of History in the University of Kansas 



[From the Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for 
1912, pages 69-86] 



Madison 

Published for the Society 

1913 



"^ 



[Separate No. 149] 



The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
By Frank Heywood Hodder, Ph. M. 

Professor of History in the University of Kansas 



[From the Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for 
191 2, pages 69-86] 



Madison 

PubHshed for the Society 

19^3 



D. OF 0. 



^. 




FltA.NK llKVWUUl) lluDDi: 



Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 



By Frank Heywood Hodder 

Current events portend a new era of American political his- 
tory. The division in the Republican party suggests the dis- 
ruption of the Democratic party in 1860 and the earlier origin 
of the Republican party itself. The Republican party resulted 
directly from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. It is still generally believed that 
this measure was proposed by Stephen A. Douglas in further- 
ance of his selfish ambition for the presidency. This is the 
view of the standard histories of Schouler and Rhodes, of Pro- 
fessor Smith's volume in Hart's "American Nation" series and 
of a recent popular life of Douglas by Henry Parker Willis. 
Stephen Arnold Douglas, with the accent on the Arnold, has 
been the cry of all, ever since von Hoist gave currency to the 
phrase. Before entering on a new era of party history it may 
not be amiss to inquire whether we have correctly appraised 
the event that ushered in the present one. 
/ The Kansas-Nebraska act was the resultant of four distinct 
elements. Of these the first and most important was the agita- 
tion for a transcontinental railroad which was begun by Asa 
Whitney in 1845. While Whitney's specific plan was event- 
ually rejected, it was he who aroused public interest and con- 
vinced the American people of the necessity of a Pacific rail- 
road. Action was, however, long delayed by rivalry between 
the various candidates for the eastern terminus of the road.^ 



» For contest over eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad, see John P. 
Davis, Union Pacific Rcbilway (Chicago, 1894), chap. iii. Other con- 
siderations delayed the building of the road, such as controversy over 
the power of the federal government and the mode of construction. 

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Eastern interests, controlling navigation upon the Great Lakes 
and the Erie canal, and owning the railways centering in Chi- 
cago, wanted a road west from Chicago through Iowa and by 
way of South Pass to the Pacific. Somewhat later, with the 
development of ^linnesota ana Oregon, a project emerged for 
a road much farther north connecting Lake Superior and the 
Columbia. St. Louis wanted the road west through .Misj,ouri 
and thence across the mountains. The principal southern 
routes contemplated an outlet on the Atlantic at Charleston. 
Memphis, expecting to connect with Charleston by roads pro- 
jected and in part under construction, wanted a road to Albu- 
querque and thence, either by Walker's pass or the Gila, to 
California. Vicksburg, also expecting through connection with 
Charleston, wanted a road west through Shreveport to El Paso 
and tlience by the Gila route to San Diego. Southern 
Louisiana and Texas were both unwilling to have the 
Pacific trade carried north of them by rail to Charleston 
and wanted an outlet on the Gulf. Thus the situation was 
inextricably confused. Not only was there sectional division 
between the North and West on the one hand and the South on 
the other, but Northern interest's were divided between three 
distinct routes and Southern interests between as many more. 
The rivalry was all the keener because it was supposed at that 
time that not more than one Pacific railway would ever be needed 
and that the first one constructed would remain the permanent 
highway across the continent. 

Besides rivalry for the eastern terminal, two other influences 
blocked Pacific railway legislation. The Pacific Steamship Com- 
pany, owned by New York capital, operated a line of steamships 
to Panama, and in 1849 incorporated a company for the con- 
struction of a railway across the Isthmus of Panama. At the 
same time New Orleans capital was promoting a railway across 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Thus steamship and isthmus rail- 
way interests both in New York and New Orleans were opposed 
to any transcontinental railway at all. ,' 

At the beginning, Pacific railway projects necessarily favored 
a northern route, as that was the only one then within the ter- 
ritory of the United States ; but with the acquisition of New 
Mexico and California the tables were turned. The IMexican 



Kansas-Nebraska Act 

War was fought quite as much in the interest of the expansion of 
Southern trade as in the interest of the extension of slave territory. 
The South wanted California and the trade with the Orient. 
Trist 's instructions called for the cession of Southern California 
and a boundary along the line of the thirty-second parallel. He 
failed to get Southern California and had to content himself with 
the Gila River as a boundary; coupled, however, with the provi- 
sion that if upon examination it should prove more advantageous 
to build a railroad on the south bank of the river, Mexico would 
make an agreement allowing its construction. 

In 1849 Benton introduced his first bill in the Senate for a 
great central national highway from St. Louis to San P'ran- 
ciseo, between the parallels of thirty-eight and thirty-nine, and 
in 1850 made his famous speech in favor of what he called ' ' the 
buffalo trail." In both years conventions were held in different 
parts of the country in the interest of the various tei'minals. 
Stephen A. Douglas presided over the convention held at St. 
Louis in 1849. While the convention declared for a St. Louis 
terminal, a resolution in favor of Benton's buffalo trail was de- 
feated, and one in favor of the South Pass route substituted, a 
route that logically required an Iowa and Chicago terminal. 

Above all other things Douglas was interested in the rail- 
road development of the West. IMore than any other man he 
contributed to the upbuilding of the city of Chicago by mak- 
ing it the railroad centre of the Middle West. In 1850 he 
carried through the land grant for the Illinois Central, by 
Avhich he bound together the northern and southern sections 
of his own state and eventually joined the Great Lakes and 
the Gulf. With respect to the Pacific rail'var question. Doug- 
las was in a difficult position. His private interests and those 
of the people of northern Illinois were bound up in the devel- 
opment of Chicago, where he lived. Southern Illinois on the 
other hand was tributary to St. Louis, and the interests of 
that section demanded a St. Louis terminal. If Douglas fa- 
\ored a Chicago terminal, he sacrificed the interests of the 
people of southern Illinois and laid himself open to the charge 
of favoring his private interests. If he favored a St. Louis 
terminal, he sacrificed his own interosts and those of his 
Northern constituents. 'It is somewhat significant that the St. 

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Louis eonvc:ition, over which he presided, while declaring for 
a St. Louis terminal, nevertheless adopted a route that logi- 
cally required a Chicago terminal. 

The organization of New Mexico in 1850 gave supporters of 
the southern route a great advantage. It was indispensably- 
necessary that the territory through which the road was to be 
built, be organized, in order to provide means for building it 
by the sale of land and in order to provide both protection 
and business after the road should be built. Unless the north- 
ern territory could also be organized, the chance of securing 
a northern route was lost. 

1^ The second element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was 
the difficulty in the way of organizing this region, presented 
by the controversy respecting its status as to slavery ?" The 
^lissouri Compromise provided that slavery in this region 
should forever be prohibited, but the question vrhether "for- 
ever" meant forever or was limited to the territorial period 
was left open at the time ; and each side, as is usual in such 
cases, put its own interpretation upon the term. When Texas 
was annexed in 1845, Douglas tried to apply the principle to 
which, nine years later, he gave the name of popular sover- 
eignty, by moving that states admitted from Texas be slave 
or free as their people should desire; but it Avas decided to 
restrict this provision to states formed south of the Missouri 
Compromise line, and Douglas himself moved the clause which 
declared that states formed north of this line should forever 
be free. Thus Douglas and the majority in Congress at that 
time accepted the Northern interpretation, that "forever" 
meant forever. 

The question of the status of slavery in the territories was 
revived by the discussion of the organization of Oregon and 
of the territory to be acquired from Mexico. In this discus- 
sion two opinions developed with respect to the power of Con- 
gress: one that Congress had plenary power and might either 
prohibit slavery altogether or divide the territory by a com- 
promise line; and the other, formulated by Calhoun, that slav- 
ery was guaranteed by the Constitution and that Congress 
could neither prohibit it in the territory nor allow the people 
to do so. The Democrats divided on this issue in the cam- 
paign of 1848 and a part of them organized the Free Soil 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

party. Cass undertook in his famous Nicholson letter to evade 
the issue by taking the ground that slavery was a local ques- 
tion to be decided by the people of each state, subject however 
to the Constitution.- In other words the question of slavery 
was to be left to the people of each state — if the Constitu- 
tion would admit, but not if the Constitution would not. This 
was a resort to the familiar expedient of a plank that could 
be construed one way in one section and the opposite way in 
the other, Cass's object being not only to secure the nomina- 
tion for the presidency, but also to preserve the integrity of 
his party. 

The Compromise of 1850 admitted California as a free state 
and organized the territories of Utah and New Mexico with 
the proviso that, when admitted as states, they should be 
received with or without slavery as their constitutions should 
prescribe at the time of their admission. The territorial bills 
were drafted by Douglas and finally passed in the exact forra 
in which he originally reported them. In the admission of 
California the North gained an extra state and it was therefore 
the turn for the admission of a slave state. The South would 
not organize a free territory in the trans-Missouri region, which 
would certainly become another free state, and the North would 
not open this region to slavery by the repeal of the Missouri Com- 
promise ; but, unless it could be organized, there was no hope 
for a northern route for the Pacific railroad. 
t The third element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was the 
local demand that developed in Missouri and Iowa for the or- 
ganization of Nebraska for the express purpose of furnishing 
a route for the Pacific railway. The development of the move- 
ment in Missouri has been admirably traced by Professor 
Ray.^ Opposition to Benton's continuance in the Senate had 



^ There is an excellent study by M. M. Quaife, The doctrine of non- 
intervention with slavery in the territories (Chicago 1910) which by 
reason of having been privately printed as a doctor's thesis, is less 
known than it deserves to be. 

»P. O. Ray, Repeal of the Missouri Compromise (Cleveland, 1909). 
Unfortunately Professor Ray has made the presentation of this subject 
a basis for the untenable theory that the Kansas-Nebraska act was the 
work of Atchison. The force of Atchison's drunken speech is broken 
by his later utterances. It was Dixon who forced direct repeal. Atchi- 
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been long gathering in Missouri, and the validity of the Mis- 
souri prohibition was made the issue between his supporters 
and opponents. In 1847 the Bentonites carried a resolution 
in the state legislature, affirming the validity of the Missouri 
Compromise; but by 1849 Claigorne F. Jackson's counter-reso- 
lutions were carried, denouncing the Missouri prohibition, 
affirming that the right to prohibit slavery in a territory be- 
longed to the people of the territory and instructing their 
senators to act accordingly. Benton made these instructions 
the issue of his campaign for reelection, and was defeated by 
a coaliiion of the Auti-Bentonites and Whigs. He was imme- 
diately sent to the House by the St. Louis district, and in 
1853 began a campaign for election to the Senate to succeed 
Atchison upon the platform of a Missouri terminal for the 
Pacific railway and the immediate opening of Nebraska to 
settlement in order to secure it. The organization of Ne- 
braska was not needed by the Westward movement, as there 
were still in Missouri thousands of acres of unoccupied land, 
but it was indispensable to a Missouri terminus for the Pacific 
railroad. Under Benton's inspiration, numerous meetings 
were held in western Missouri, which sent memorials to Con- 
gress asking the immediate organization of Nebraska. 

The development of a similar movement in Iowa has not yet 
been traced in detail; but between 1850 and 1853, under the 
leadership of Senators Dodge and Jones, numerous public meet- 
ings were held in the western part of the state, requesting the 
immediate organization of Nebraska. Hadley D. Johnson says 
that he removed from Indiana to Council Bluffs in 1850 with 
the expectation that it would be the eastern terminus of the 
transcontinental railroad; and that, with this end in view, he 
supported in the Iowa senate in 1852 the petition for land grants 
for three Iowa railroads converging there.* Thus it appears 
that the validity of the Missouri Compromise had for some time 



son was allied with the Calhoun wing of the Democrats, and would not 
have fathered a bill which assumed to establish popular sovereignty. 
As will appear later, Dodge of Iowa was the associate of Douglas in the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act. 

Mladley D. Johnson, "How the Kansas-Nebraska boundary line was 
established", in Nebraska State Hist. Soc. Transactions, ii, pp. 80-92. 
Council Bluffs was then called Kanesville. 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

been an issue in Missouri and that there had developed in both 
Missouri and Iowa a considerable demand for the organization 
of Nebraska, and that this was desired in each state for the 
purpose of securing the eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad. 

(The fourth element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was the 
result of the movement in Missouri and Iowa. This was the de- 
mand for organization, in the territory itself, by the emigi-ant 
Indian tribes under the leadership of the Wyandots.^) The 
Wyandots removed from Ohio in 1843 and settled on the west 
bank of the Missouri at the mouth of the Kansas. They were 
intelligent people with an organized government, and, while 
nominally Indian, were predominantly white in blood. 
They realized that the dissolution of their tribal relations 
was only a question of time, and wanted to secure the 
eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad and the opening of 
the territory to settlement in order to sell their lands at the 
highest possible price. In the fall of 1852 they sent Abelard 
Guthrie as a delegate to Congress to urge organization. In 
the summer of 1853 a convention of the emigrant tribes and 
of the white men in the territory was held at Wyandot, which 
passed elaborate resolutions ° declaring for Benton's central 
route for the Pacific railway, asking for the organization of 
Nebraska Territory, establishing a provisional government, and 
providing for the election of a territorial delegate to Congress. 

At the ensuing election for territorial delegate the Rev. Thos. 



•This subject was developed in 1899 by William E. Connelley in hit 
"Provisional Government of Nebraska Territory", issued as Id, iii. The 
material is repeated in Kansas State Hist. Soc. Transactions, vi, pp. 
97-110. With the enthusiasm of a discoverer, Mr. Connelley exagger- 
ates the importance of the movement. Hadley Johnson's article (see 
ante, note 4) and Connelley's book (p. 31) are the earliest suggestions, 
that I have found of the influence of the Pacific railroad route upon the 
organization of Kansas and Nebraska. 

• This meeting was promoted and the resolution drawn by Maj. Wil- 
liam Gilpin, a supporter of Benton and afterward first territorial gov- 
ernor of Colorado. Gilpin had secured the adoption of similar resolu- 
tions at Independence, Mo., in 1849. Se'e appendix to his Central Gold 
Region (Philadelphia, 1860). Mr. Connelley writes me that he was 
mistaken in supposing that the resolutions were in the handwriting of 
W. T. Dyer, chairman of the committee on resolutions. 

6 [ 75 ] 



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Johnson, Methodist missionary to the Shawnees at Westport, was 
chosen. Hearing that an election for territorial delegate had been 
called and fearing that their railroad interests would suffer at 
the hands of a delegate chosen by the inhabitants of the south- 
ern part of the territory, the people of Council Bluffs crossed 
the river on the appointed day and elected Hadley D. Johnson 
delegate. Both Johnsons proceeded to Washington, and, while 
their influence was probably slight, nevertheless the presence 
of two representatives from the territory urging its organiza- 
tion could not have been wholly without effect. This summary 
of the elements that entered into the passage of the Kansas- 
Nebraska act discloses the fact that at every point the pur- 
pose was to secure a northern route for the Pacific railway. 

The events in the struggle over the location of this railroad 
indicate that the organization of Nebraska was a part of the 
larger controversy. Douglas served in the House from 1843 to 
1847, and in the Senate from 1847 until his death in 1861 . As 
early as 1845 he proposed a grant of land to the states of Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, for a railroad from Lake Erie by 
way of Chicago and Rock Island to the Missouri River, and 
prepared a bill for the organization of the territories of Neb- 
raska and Oregon and a land grant to them for a railway from 
the Missouri River to the Pacific.'^ Nothing came of the pro- 
posals, as the title to Oregon was still in dispute and Califor- 
Dia had not yet been acquired. \They are significant only as 
showing that these two purposes were coupled in Douglas's 
mind from the beginning of his national career, and at a time 
when serious agitation for a Pacific railway had hardly begun/ 
In December, 1845, he was made chairman of the House com- 
mittee on territories. When he was elected to the Senate in 
1847, he transferred the House chairmanship to his friend and 
political lieutenant William A. Richardson, just elected to Con- 
gress for the first time, and was himself elected to the chair- 
manship of the corresponding Senate committee and continued 
in that position for over ten years. The organization of the 



'J. Madison Cutts, Brief treatise upon constitutional and party ques- 
tions (New York, 1866), p. 218. 

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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

territories thus became the principal business of his political 
life.« 

In 1848, during both sessions of the Thirtieth Congress, Doug- 
las introduced bills for the organization of Nebraska, but with- 
out result. The stream of emigration that poured over the Oregon 
trail after the discovery of gold in California, demonstrated 
the necessity of organization, but the struggle over the Com- 
promise of 1850 postponed the subject for the time being. The 
whole history of the subsequent discussion of Pacific railway 
projects indicates the co-operation of Douglas and of Dodge 
of Iowa, both working for a Chicago and Iowa terminal for 
the road. During the first session of the Thirty-second Con- 
gress, the Senate passed (March 17, 1852) a bill introduced by 
Senator Jones of Iowa and amended by Senator Dodge, pro- 
viding for the grant of land to Iowa for the construction of 
two railroads — one, north and south, from Dubuque to Keo- 
kuk, and the other, east and west, from Davenport to the Mis- 
souri Kiver.^ A month later (April 22) Douglas introduced a 
bill for the protection of the emigrant route and for a tele- 
graph line and overland mail from the IMissouri River to Cali- 
fornia and Oregon. (At the beginning of the second session of 
the Thirty-second Congress the Douglas bill was referred tft 
a special committee, which, February 1, • 1853, reported a j 
substitute bill for the construction of a Pacific railway, leaving 
to the president the designation of the route and terminus. 
The bill was buried by adjournment on February 22, Douglas 
insisting upon putting every senator on record by calling 
for the yeas and nays. The next day the Senate voted an ap- 
propriation for the survey of the several routes under the di- 
rection of the secretary of war, coupled with the requirement 



»An excellent study is Allen Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas (New 
York, 1908). Professor Johnson, however, represents the Pacific rail- 
road as "crossing the path"' of the Kansas-Nebraska Act rather than as 
its mainspring (see pp. 222 and 238), and he does not develop the ex- 
tent of Douglas's activity in behalf of a Pacific railroad and the Iowa 
route. 

'Louis Pelzer, Augustus Crcsar Dodge (State Hist. Soc. of Iowa Bio- 
graphical Series), chap, xiii; chap, xii treats of the Pacific railroad. 
The natural order of these chapters is reversed. 



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that reports of the surveys be laid before Congress ou the first 
]\Ionday in February, 1854. 

While the Senate was debating the Pacific railroad bill, the 
House passed a bill for the organization of Nebraska. De- 
cember 13, 1852, Hall of Missouri reported a bill for the organ- 
ization of the Territory of the Platte, which was referred to 
the committee on territories. February 2, 1853, Richardson 
reported from this committee a substitute bill for th.e organiza- 
tion of Nebraska, without mention of slavery, and the bill 
pas-<?ed February 10 by a vote of 98 to 43. Nearly all the 
votes against the bill came from the South, and both Hall and 
Richardson " charged in the debate that they were !)ased upon 
opposition to a northern route for the Pacific railway. R.eply- 
ing to Howard of Texas, Mr. Hall said: "He wishes to treat 
with those Indians, to go through that slow process and in the 
meantime all the great objects of the bill will be lost and the 
emigration to the Pacific will be driven to another portion of 
the Union from the route that it now follov/s." Elsewhere in 
the speech he exclaimed: "Everybody is talking about a rail- 
road to the Pacific. In the name of God, how is a railroad to 
be made, if you will never let people live on the lands through 
which it passes ?"^^ Douglas made repeated efforts to get the 
House bill before the Senate. On the last day of the feession 
(March 3, 1853) it was laid on the table by a vote of 27 to 17. 
Of those voting, every Southern senator voted against the bill, 
except the two from Missouri,^^ ^nd every Northern senator 
for it, except five from the Northeast. Opposition in both houses 
was ostensibly based on the fact that the Indian title had not 
been extinguished, although the bill provided that it should not 
take effect until this had been done. The only progress that was 
made toward organization was the passage of an appropriation 
for the extinction of this title. 

Professor Ray argues upon two grounds, that the votes on the 
Richardson bill do not indicate that the opposition was 



" Richardson's speech is quoted by Ray, p. 241. Ray erroneously says 
that It is the only reference to the subject in the debate. 
" 32 Cong., 2 sess., Congressional Olohe. pp. 560, 562, 56S. 
" 32 Cong., 2 sess.. Senate Journal, p. 322. 

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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

connected with the rivalry over the Pacific railway route: firsts 
that in the Senate twenty-two members did not vote at all ; and 
second, that in the House two members from Louisiana and a 
considerable part of the New York delegation voted for the 
bill and only one of the Texas members against it/^ In regard 
to the Senate vote, it may be said that it equalled the average 
vote of the session and that it w^as taken on the last day, after 
many members had gone home. In regard to the House vote, 
it will be remembered that the South was itself divided on the 
subject of the Pacific railroad. Louisiana and southern Texas 
were opposed to a road with an outlet at Charleston, and Louis- 
iana was interested in the proposed Tehuantepec railroad. 
The two Louisiana votes for Nebraska may have been intended 
to offset the Southern project, and the failure of one of the 
tw^o Texas members to vote is not surprising.^* New York in- 
terests were divided between the Pacific Steamship and Panama 
Railway companies on the one hand and the Erie canal on the 
other. Erie canal interests required a northern route for the 
Pacific railway, and a division of the vote in that quarter was 
therefore to be expected. The vote does not therefore militate 
against the theory that Pacific railway considerations influen- 
ced the attitude of the House toward the organization of Neb- 
raska. The situation was, how^ever, too complex to render it 
possible to interpret the vote from any single point of view. 

Dnring the summer of 1853, Jefferson Davis dispatched the 
exploring expeditions ordered by Congress to examine the sev- 
eral routes under discussion for the proposed transcontinental 
railway, and their reports were expected early in the following 
year. Preliminary surveys of the Gila route had indicated that 
a railroad in that quarter could best be built south of the river, 
and it had come to be realized that it was not practicable to 



" Ray, pp. 239-241. 

" It should be said that Howard, who opposed the bill, was from San 
Antonio, and that Scurry, who did not vote, came from Clarkesville in 
northern Texas. Scurry, whose failure to vote impresses Professor 
Ray, appears, despite his name, not to have been a very active member 
of Congress. He is referred to but three times in the index to the 
Globe, for this session: the first time he arrived nearly a month late; 
the second time he moved to adjourn; and the third time he announced 
that he had paired. 

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Wisconsin Historical Society- 
build a road in Mexican territory as contemplated by the 
treaty of Guadaloupe. Accordingly, President Pierce sent to 
Mexico General Gadsden, president of the Charleston road 
with which the proposed Pacific road was to connect, with in- 
structions to purchase the necessary territory south of the Gila, 
and by December 30 he had done so.^^ Colonel Manypenny, 
commissioner of Indian affairs, was sent by the secretary of the 
interior to the Indian tribes of the Northwest with instructions 
to make a preliminary survey and to negotiate treaties at his 
discretion. Manypenny consorted with Southern men while in 
the territory and returned Avithout negotiating any treaties, 
reporting that it was confidently believed that the necessary 
treaties could be secured in the following spring, at which time 
it was expected that the southern Pacific road would be defi- 
nitely located. If anything were to be done to prevent it, it 
must be done quickly, 

Douglas spent the summer of 1853 in Europe and returned a 
month before the opening of Congress. Soon after his return 
he wrote a confidential letter ^^ indicating that the subjects up- 
permost in his mind were the disposition of the surplus, the 
river an'd harbor question, and the Pacific railroad. Referring 
to his own chances for the presidency, he said: ''The party is 
in distracted condition and it requires all our wisdom, pru- 
dence, and energy to consolidate its powers and perpetuate its 
principles. Let us leave the presidency out of view for at least 
two years to come." 

The first session of the Thirty-third Congress convened on 
December 5, 1853. On the first day of the session Dodge of 
Iowa, as chairman of the committee on public lands, gave no- 
tice of his intention to introduce a bill for the organization of 
Nebraska, and on the 14th introduced a bill identical in form 
with the Richardson bill of the preceding session. The bill was 
referred to the committee on territories and returned by Doug- 
las January 4, 1854 with amendments, accompanied by his 



" Gadsden was not nominated minister to Mexico until February 2, 
1854, was confirmed February 13, and the treaty was not ratified until 
April 28; see Senate Executive Journal. The treaty included other sub- 
jects than the boundary. 

"Letter to Lanphier and Walker, Nov. 11, 1853; Johnson, pp. 226- 
228; Ray, pp. 185, 186. 

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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

famous report. The amendments consisted of the insertion in 
the bill of two clauses taken verbatim from the Utah and New 
Mexico acts, which Douglas had himself drawn and which both 
parties professed to accept as a final settlement of the slavery 
controversy. The first clause provided that "when admitted 
as a state or states, the said territory * * * shall be re- 
ceived into the Union with or without slavery, as their consti- 
tutions may prescribe at the time of their admission". The 
second clause provided that questions involving title to slaves 
should be determinable in the local courts, subject to appeal to 
the supreme court of the United States. The report explained 
that the committee did not assume either to affirm or deny the 
Missouri Compromise, but that they considered that its effect 
was limited to the territorial period and that the question of 
its validity during that period was a judicial one. 

Douglas saw that he could not secure the organization of 
Nebraska and thus pave the way for a northern route for the 
Pacific railway without some concession to the South. In the 
original bill this concession consisted in limiting the force of 
the Missouri Compromise to the territorial period. The pro- 
vision that the question of the validity of the prohibition dur- 
ing the territorial period should go to the courts, was a conces- 
sion only in appearance, since it belonged and would have 
gone to the courts in any event. Six days later (January 10), 
Douglas made a second concession by adding a section to the 
bill which was evidently intended to apply the principle of 
popular sovereignty to the territory. His hand was further 
forced by Dixon's motion for direct repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise, and January 24 he brought in a second bill which 
declared the Compromise inoperative on the ground that it was 
superseded by the principles of the Compromise of 1850. This 
w^as verbal jugglery intended to cover his defeat. February 
7 he made another amendment, forced upon him by the Demo- 
cratic caucus, which applied popular sovereignty, in Cass's 
phrase, "subject to the Constitution". Douglas did not orig- 
inally intend to repeal the Missouri Compromise, but having 
made one concession he made a second and then w^as forced 
to make a third and a fourth. His object was clearly to secure 
the organization of the territory at any cost. He may be blamed 
for yielding to pressure, but the facts disprove the charge that 
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he set out to repeal the IMissoun Compromise in order to Avin 
support for the presidency. He yielded to pressure to save the 
party. The Whig party had been destroyed by the Compro- 
mise of 1850, and the Democratic party was "in distracted 
condition". Northern Democrats refused to extend slave ter- 
ritory, and Southern Democrats demanded a guarantee of 
slavery in all territory. Douglas hoped to save the party by 
accepting Cass's expedient of relegating the question of slav- 
ery to the people of the territories, "subject to the Constitu- 
tion." He failed to save the party but he did succeed in post- 
poning its disruption until 1860^ 

The amended Nebraska bill substituted two territories, Kan- 
sas and Nebraska, for a single one. It is a part of the Douglas 
tradition that two territories were created in order that one 
might be slave. Douglas at the time clearly stated the reason 
for tv70 territories.^^ The tAYii_Johnsons, and, what was far 
more important, the representatives of both Iowa and ]\Iissouri, 
demanded two territories. Dodge's speech on this point re- 
veals the extent to which the question of the route for the Pa- 
cific railway was the controlling one. "Originally", said 
Dodge, "I favored the organization of one territory, but repre- 
sentations from our constituents, and a more critical examina- 
tion of the subject — ^having an eye to the systems of internal 
improvement, which must be adopted by the people of Neb- 
raska and Kansas to develop their resources — satisfied my col- 
league, who was a member of the committee who reported this 
bill, and myself that the great interests of the whole- country 
and especially of our state demand two territories, otherwise 
the seat of government and leading thoroughfares must have 
fallen south of lowa".^^ As Professor Johnson puts it: "One 
territory meant aid to the central route ; two territories meant 
an equal chance for both northern and central routes. As the 
representative of Chicago interests, Douglas was not blind to 
these considerations." 

This session of Congress was too much engrossed by the 
Kansas-Nebraska controversy to consider seriously the Pacific 
railroad question. A select committee on the subject was ap- 



Johnson, pp. 238, 239. 

33 Cong., 1 sess., Congressioyial Globe, App., p. 382. 

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Kansas-Nebraska Act 

pointed in each house. Gwin of California was chairman of 
the Senate committee, but. Douglas appears to have been its 
moving spirit. IMarch 13, 1854, a joint bill providing for two 
roads, one at the south and the other west from Minnesota, was 
introduced in both houses but was not considered in the Sen- 
ate and was laid on the table in the House. Douglas did not 
intend that it should be passed, but was playing for time until 
Nebraska should be organized. Having organized Nebraska he 
was ready for the fray. 

At the second session of this Congress, January 9, 1855, 
Douglas reported his railroad bill in the Senate and it was re- 
ferred to the select committee and reported back on the loth. 
The bill provided for three roads: one west from Texas, 
another west from Missouri or low^a, and a third w'est from - 
Minnesota. Within the limits designated, the bill left the loca- 
tion of th:e roads to the contractors.^^ The day after the bill 
was reported back to the Senate, Dunbar of Louisiana moved 
to substitute it for the bill pending in the House. Two days 
later, John G. Davis of Indiana moved to amend by substitut- 
ing a single road west from Iowa or Missouri, and in this form 
the bill was passed ; but some question arising as to pairs, Ben- 
ton rallied the opposition and it w^as lost upon reconsideration 
by a single vote. In the Senate, Gtiyer of Missouri opposed 
the bill on the ground that the Eastern interests would choose 
the Iowa terminal, since they would furnish the capital and al-- 
ready owned the Chicago and Iowa roads. Douglas, neverthe- 
less, carried it through the Senate (February 19) but it was 
not again taken up in the House. 

February 27, Jefferson Davis made his final report on the 
Pacific railway surveys, in wiiich he recommended the adop- 
tion of the Gila route. Douglas had a weakness for sharp par- 
liamentary practice. The substitution of his bill in the House 
and the restriction to a single central road look very much 
like a prearranged plan.^" Had the bill passed the House there 



"See Id, 32 Cong., 2 sess., p. 749, for text of the bill. 

" Notice that the member who moved substitution in the House was 
from Louisiana. John G. Davis made a speech at the preceding session 
in favor of a single central road: 33 Cong., 1 sess., Congressional Qlohe, 
App., p. 961. It would be interesting to know the relations brtween 
Douglas and Davis. 

[ 83 ] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

is little doubt that he could have carried it through the Senate 
before Davis's report was received. Douglas thus missed by a 
edngle vote in the House accomplishing the purpose for which 
he had organized Nebraska. 

The excitement over the struggle in Kansas and the pending 
presidential election was so great that it was impossible to se- 
cure any Pacific railway legislation during the Thirty-fourth 
Congress ; but in 1856 both parties declared in their platforms 
for a transcontinental road. The Gwin biU, introduced in the 
Senate during the first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress, 
provided for a road between San Francisco and some point on 
the Missouri River between the mouths of the Big Sioux and 
the Kansas, and Douglas made a speech in its support. As it 
finally passed the Senate at the following session, it provided 
for three roads, which was equivalent to making no provision 
at all for a road, as everyone knew that only one could be 
built at a time. Sectional feeling had been so intensified that 
the chance had passed of securing agreement on any one 
route. 

V When the Kansas-Nebraska act is considered in connection 
with the discussion of the Pacific railroad routes which pre- 
ceded and followed it, the conclusion is irresistible that it was 
passed chiefly in furtherance of the project for the Chicago 
and Iowa route. If, however, that purpose had been alleged 
at the time, it would have prevented its passage. The ex- 
citement over the Missouri Compromise obscured the real is- 
sue and carried the bill. While Douglas failed by the nar- 
rowest possible margin of accomplishing his ulterior object, 
he nevertheless blocked the building of the southern road 
which in 1853 was upon the eve of accomplishment. He in- 
cidentally blocked the project for the absorption of all 
Mexico, which Jefferson Davis intended should follow the 
building of the southern road,^^ and he very possibly saved 
California to the Union, since a southern road, built before 
the war, might easily have carried that state into the Confed- 
eracy. 

Professor Ray argues that Douglas was not controlled by 
Pacific railway considerations in proposing the Kansas- 



" W. E. Dodd, Jefferson Davis (Philadelphia, 1907), p. 161. 
[84 1 



Kansas-Nebraska Act 

Nebraska act, for the reason that he never alleged that 
ground, when hard-pressed, as he afterwards was, to defend 
his course.-- The difficulty of Douglas's position in his own 
state has already been noted. He could not openly favor 
either a Chicago or a St. Louis terminal without losing sup- 
port in one section of it or the other. His position was sim- 
ilar in the Union, He remained a presidential candidate un- 
til his final nomination and defeat. If at any time he had 
explained that the act generally accepted as a concession to 
the South was in reality intended to sacrifice Southern to 
Northern railway interests, he would instantly have lost all 
Southern support.) 

Professor Johnson has pointed out that the vote in the 
Democratic convention of 1852 indicates that Douglas was un- 
der no necessity of currying favor in the South, but that he 
was weakest in the Middle States.^^ If Douglas had his pres- 
idential aspirations in mind in proposing the organization of 
Nebraska, it is more reasonable to suppose that he expected that 
a Chicago terminal for the Pacific railroad would strengthen 
him with the Eastern interests and win support where he most 
needed it. The South did not desert him until popular sov- 
ereignty failed to make Kansas a slave state. 

Douglas was an opportunist in politics. He had neither 
the insight nor the foresight of a great statesman. He failed 
utterly to realize the force of the rising anti-slavery sentiment 
in the North. He did not foresee the length to which he 
would have to go in order to organize Nebraska, nor the op- 
position that it would arouse. He anticipated neither the 
struggle that popular sovereignty precipitated in Kansas nor 
the fact that it would be undermined by the supreme court. 
When that court decided against it, he was compelled to fall 
back upon the doctrine of unfriendly legislation, promulgated 
at Freeport. This enabled Lincoln to say that Judge Douglas 
claims that "a thing may be lawfully driven away from where 
it has a lawful right to be." 

Nevertheless Douglas was the dominant force in American 
politics during the decade from 1850 to 1860. Lincoln was 



" Ray, p. 242. 
*» Johnson, p. 206. 



[85] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

exceptional, Douglas was typical. In highest degree he typi- 
fied the new West, its vigor, its optimism, and its crudity. 
The parallel is a striking one between Webster's seventli-of- 
March speech and Douglas's organization of Kansas and Ne- 
braska. Both men were accused of bidding for Southern sup- 
port for the presidency. It is now admitted that Yfebster's 
course was dictated by devotion to the Union.. It ought to be 
equally clear that Douglas's was controlled by devotion to the 
development of the West. But when the supreme test came, 
Douglas knew neither North nor South, East nor West, but 
threw all his strength into the fight for the Union. The minor 
faults of his political career were more than atoned for in its 
close. "Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it." 



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